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1. Title: THE VISIBILITY OF GOODNESS
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Summary

The main objective of the Nicomachean Ethics is to examine how one should acquire and actualize the appropriate intellectual and ethical virtues in order to accomplish morally good actions (praxeis). In this line of argument, Book 6 is devoted to analyzing that phronêsis and ethical virtues depend upon each other and furthermore, not to say principally, that they constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for a good action to be performed: if the agent possesses ethical virtues and phronêsis, the actions he brings forth are necessarily good. A complementary approach is, however, required, since moral action does not merely constitute the outcome of a decision (prohairesis) of the agent occurring within his psychê but, at the same time, an event in the world accessible to external observers who are invited to appraise ‘from without’, so to speak, whether an action is really and fully good or not. If this appraisal were not possible, no genuine kind of praise and blame—which are, according to Aristotle, core constituents of moral experience— would be possible either. I mean to demonstrate that, according to Aristotle, the goodness of moral actions does not display any specific kind of ambiguity or invisibility. To support my thesis further, I will conclude by highlighting the way in which the visibility of goodness is thematized and praised by Aristotle as a practical desideratum met by two major ethical virtues related to others (pros heteron), namely, by friendship (philia) and magnanimity (megalopsuchia).